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1. Macos malware runonly applescripts to detection for free#
2. Macos malware runonly applescripts to detection software#
3. Macos malware runonly applescripts to detection code#

braved A majority of these processes are for installed browsers, and their significance is related to the data exfiltration features that will be discussed in the next sections.ĩ Figure 13. SIP Enabled Status It then proceeds to kill the running processes listed: 1.

Macos malware runonly applescripts to detection code#

Code snippet for checking system information This code first pings to check if connection is established, then sends the following basic system information of the infected user: 1. The domains adobestatscom and flixpricecom are also listed for use for C&C communication.Ĩ Figure 12. List of names for dropped app bundles A hardcoded list of names to assign dropped app bundles containing the same payload main.scpt is present, which matches dropped bundles found in our testing. Checking this reveals that it holds a lot of functions and calls that are responsible for the observed infection behavior: Figure 11. After investigating the C&C server, we were able to obtain a plaintext AppleScript version. Contents of dropped app bundle Xcode.app found in the Application Scripts folder Further checks on main.scpt show that it is compiled as a run-only binary script and can't be decompiled with static methods. Pods is a copy of the Mach-O xcassetħ Main Payload Figure 10. Once a new screenshot is taken, the previous one is deleted. jpg refers to the screenshot of the current desktop a new screenshot is taken approximately every minute and the filename for the screenshot changed in increments of one. Note that the symbol ~ indicates the current user.domain refers to the file containing the target command and control (C&C) server address.report refers to the file containing the file path and app bundle dropped its use will be discussed in the next section. Reference to hidden contents In our testing, executing the Mach-O xcassets shows that it drops the following files in the folder ~/Library/Caches/GameKit/. Once the project is built and compiled, we suspect that the malicious code is executed. Hidden contents of project In one of the project files (.pbxproj), a reference to Assets.xcassets was found. Assets.xcassets shell script to call the Mach-O malware Figure 3. The hidden folder contains the following: 1. Modified workdata string We were able to identify a hidden folder located in one of the.xcodeproj files for the project. For this incident, we initially traced an infected project s Xcode work data files and found that a reference to another folder was listed instead of to the main folder this workspace has. Inside the project, schema files that contain how each part is mapped are also generated. A sample Xcode project and its contentsģ When creating a project in Xcode, a project file (.xcodeproj) is generated that contains the code and resources to be built together.

Macos malware runonly applescripts to detection software#

Since its release, plenty of developers have used Xcode for their Apple software needs.

Macos malware runonly applescripts to detection for free#

Initial Entry Xcode is an integrated development environment (IDE) used in macos for developing Apple-related software and is available for free from the Mac AppStore. In this technical brief, we will discuss our investigation into this attack which includes the hidden Mach-o executable, its Applescript payload functions along with the three zero-day exploits we discovered, and the JS payloads it injects to exfiltrate and manipulate data from browsers. We have also identified this threat in other sources including VirusTotal and Github, which indicates this threat is at large. The threat escalates when affected developers share their projects via platforms such as GitHub, leading to a supply-chain-like attack for users who rely on these repositories as dependencies in their own projects. This poses a risk for Xcode developers in particular. This scenario is quite unusual in this case, malicious code is injected into local Xcode projects so that when the project is built, the malicious code is run. The malware has the capability to hijack Safari and inject various Javascript payloads.

Most notably, we found two zero-day exploits: one is used to steal cookies via a flaw in the behavior of Data Vaults another is used to abuse the development version of Safari.

Upon further investigation, we learned that a developer s Xcode project at large contained the source malware which leads to a rabbit hole of malicious payloads. 2 Introduction We have discovered an unusual infection related to Xcode developer projects.